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THE TRANSFORMATION OF CORPORATE
CRIMINAL LAW
Leonard Orland*
The formal and quite harsh federal rules of vicarious corporate criminal
liability remain relatively unchanged since their elaboration by the Supreme
Court in 1909.1 However, in the past decade, the operative rules of
corporate criminal liability have undergone profound change. This change
derives not from new congressional or Supreme Court command, but from
the United States Department of Justice’s (Justice Department) new and
different attitudes toward the prosecution of corporate crime.2
The first Justice Department development occurred in 2003, with the
promulgation of revised criteria for prosecution of corporations—the
Thompson Memorandum (Thompson).3 A second less visible, yet
potentially more important, Justice Department development occurred in
the years following Thompson. Since 2003 (the year of the conviction and
disintegration of Arthur Andersen), every major federal case of corporate
misconduct has been resolved without filing an indictment against the
corporation.4 The Justice Department now routinely disposes of charges of
corporate misconduct by entering into deferred prosecution or nonprosecution agreements with putative corporate defendants. Between 1992
and 2006, the Justice Department resolved forty-four criminal cases by
either a deferred prosecution or non-prosecution agreement.5 These
agreements are often complex and not always readily available to the

* Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law. B.A., 1957 Rutgers
University; J.D., 1960, University of Pennsylvania. Copyright © 2006 Leonard Orland. The
author acknowledges, with deep appreciation, the superb legal, editorial and computer assistance
of Shannon Wolf.
1. See New York Central & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909).
See also 10 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 4942 (“[I]t is held today,
almost universally, that a corporation may be liable criminally for crimes which its agents are
capable of committing on its behalf.”).
2. See, e.g., Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Deputy Attorney Gen, U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, to All Component Heads and U.S. Attorneys, Federal Prosecution of Corporations
(June 16, 1999), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/policy/Chargingcorps.html
[hereinafter Holder Memo].
3. See Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
to All Component Heads and U.S. Attorneys, Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations
(Jan. 20, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate_guidelines.htm [hereinafter
Thompson Memo]. The Thompson Memo is a revision of the 1999 Holder Memorandum. On the
changes that Thompson made to Holder, see Elkan Abramowitz & Barry A. Bohrer, Principles of
Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 4, 2003; Alan Vinegrad, Federal
Prosecution of Business Organizations: the New Guidelines, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 27, 2003.
4. The indictment of Milberg Weiss is a conspicuous exception to this trend. See Julia
Creswell, U.S. Indictment for Big Law Firm in Class Actions, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2006, at A1.
See also infra text accompanying note 193.
5. See infra Part VI, summarized in Tables I & II (all agreements in Tables I & II are on file
with author).

46

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 1

public.6 They constitute a sea change in the way the federal government
responds to perceived serious corporate misconduct. This essay explores the
contours and implications of these profound changes in the administration
of corporate criminal law.
I. TRADITIONAL AMERICAN CORPORATE CRIMINAL LAW
The idea of applying criminal law to corporate entities derives from
New York Central v. United States, a 1909 Supreme Court opinion.7 The
Supreme Court explicitly based its ruling on the perceived relationship
between corporate criminal responsibility and corporate control of the
nation’s economy.8 The Court recognized that “the great majority of
business transactions in modern times are conducted through” corporations,
and that to “give them immunity from all punishment because of the old
and exploded doctrine that a corporation cannot commit a crime would
virtually take away the only means of effectually . . . correcting the abuses
aimed at.”9 The Supreme Court perceived “no valid objection in law, and
every reason in public policy, why the corporation, which profits by the
transaction . . . shall be held punishable.”10
In 1958, the Supreme Court extended the New York Central vicarious
liability rule to partnerships:
[I]t certainly makes no difference whether the carrier which commits the
infraction is organized as a corporation, a joint stock company, a
partnership or an individual proprietorship. The mischief is the same, and
we think Congress intended to make the consequences of infraction the
same. . . . The power of Congress hardly is denied. The constitutionality of
the statute against corporations is established, and no reason is suggested
why Congress has not equal power to charge the partnership assets with a
liability and to personify the company so far as to collect a fine by a
proceeding against it by the company name. . . . The policy to be served in
this case is the same. The business entity cannot be left free to break the
law merely because . . . partners in the present [case] . . . do not personally
participate in the infraction.11

In practice, the responsibility for the vicarious criminal liability thrust
upon corporations by the New York Central rule has been quite harsh.12
Rarely has a corporation successfully defended itself against a criminal
charge if the underlying criminal responsibility of the executive has been
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

See infra text accompanying note 144.
New York Central & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909).
Id. at 495.
Id.
Id.
United States v. A & P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121, 123–26 (1958) (citation omitted).
See William S. Laufer & Alan Strudler, Corporate Intentionality, Desert, and Variants of
Vicarious Liability, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1285, 1299 (2000).
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established.13 The collective mens rea of multiple executives has been
typically combined and attributed to the corporate entity.14 American courts
have rejected defense claims that the corporation is not responsible because
the executive conduct was not authorized or was undertaken in violation of
corporate policy.15
Prior to 1960, prison sentences were rarely imposed on convicted
corporate executives. Traditionally the corporate punishment imposed on a
corporation was a fine. Probation was rarely imposed on corporations. The
traditional strategy of corporate criminal defense lawyers was to persuade
the government to indict the corporation, not culpable executives. The
proliferation of deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements
changed the default position of corporate defense lawyers who now appear
all too ready to sacrifice senior executives in order to save the corporate
entity from indictment.16
II. TRANSFORMATIVE CHANGE: CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE
TO CORPORATE CRIME
Congress has not altered the substantive law of corporate criminal
liability. However, Congress enacted two major statutory schemes affecting
a corporation facing criminal prosecution: the Sentencing Reform Act of
198417 and, in 2003, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.18

13. See infra text accompanying notes 14, 15.
14. United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844, 856 (1st Cir. 1987) (citing Steere
Tank Lines, Inc. v. United States, 330 F.2d 719, 722 (5th Cir. 1964)).
15. See United States v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 882 F.2d 656, 660 (2d Cir. 1989);
United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1006–07 (9th Cir. 1972). See also generally
James V. Dolan & Richard S. Rebeck, Corporate Criminal Liability for Acts in Violation of
Company Policy, 50 GEO. L.J. 547 (1962) (arguing that there are doubts as to whether public
policy requires across-the-board imposition of vicarious liability on the corporation for criminal
acts of all agents); Kevin B. Huff, The Role of Corporate Compliance Programs in Determining
Corporate Criminal Liability: A Suggested Approach, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1252, 1253 (1996)
(“Traditionally, the federal courts have applied the doctrine of respondeat superior, holding
corporations vicariously liable for the criminal actions of their employees. Corporations are held
liable even where lower-level employees commit crimes without the knowledge of upper
management and contrary to express corporate policy or instructions.”).
16. See, e.g., George Stamboulidis & Anjula Garg, Baker Hostetler LLP, Alternatives To
Indictment: Remedial Measures In An Age of Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution
Agreements, in INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS: LEGAL, ETHICAL & STRATEGIC ISSUES 2006, at 13,
18–20 (PLI Corp. Law and Practice, Course Handbook Series 2006) (providing examples of
corporations choosing to replace or terminate employees as part of a deferred prosecution
agreement).
17. Sentencing Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (2000).
18. Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) [hereinafter SarbanesOxley Act].
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A. THE RISE AND FALL OF THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 created the United States
Sentencing Commission.19 The Commission promulgated mandatory
sentencing guidelines for individuals in 198720 and the Organizational
Guidelines in 1991.21
The Organizational Guidelines utilize the individual guidelines offense
levels in calculating the initial fine and provide detailed guidelines for
imposition of fines (the primary sanction), as well as for the secondary
sanctions of restitution, remedial orders, and probation.22 The basic scheme
of the Organizational Guidelines is that the defendant can avoid the
imposition of a significant fine by qualifying for mitigation credits that
reward self-policing programs and cooperation with authorities.23
Additionally, the Organizational Guidelines contain rules for ancillary
sanctions such as restitution, compliance programs, and monitors, all of
which have become important features of the deferred prosecution and nonprosecution agreements considered below.24

19. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (Supp. III 2003).
20. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 2–7 (1987).
The centerpiece of the [1978 individual] Guidelines is a 258-box grid that the
Commission calls the Sentencing Table. . . . The horizontal axis of [the] grid, entitled
“Criminal History Category,” adjusts severity on the basis of the offender’s prior
conviction record. The vertical axis, entitled “Offense Level,” reflects a base severity
score for the crime committed, adjusted for those characteristics of the defendant’s
criminal behavior that the Sentencing Commission has deemed relevant to sentencing.
The Guidelines, through a complex set of rules requiring significant expertise to apply,
instruct the sentencing judge on how to calculate each of these factors.
KATE STITH AND JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS 3 (1998).
21. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 8 (1991). There is a marked contrast between the
individual and the organizational guidelines in terms of underlying purpose. As Federal Judge Jed
Rakoff has explained, in the late 1980s, when the Commission turned to devising the
organizational guidelines, it found that:
[Because] there had been relatively few federal sentences for organizations . . . the
historical data was sparse and ambiguous. For similar reasons, it was unclear what
inadequacies, if any, had characterized prior organizational sentencing. As for the
Congressional mandate, it was debatable whether Congress had required the
Commission to promulgate organizational sentencing guidelines at all. Finally, the
Commission, perhaps reflecting the more general absence of consensus regarding the
goals of corporate criminal liability, was frank to admit that among its members “there
was no consensus as to a single theory of organizational sentencing.”
JED. S. RAKOFF, ET AL., CORPORATE SENTENCING GUIDELINES: COMPLIANCE AND MITIGATION
§ 1.04[2] (2005).
22. See RAKOFF, supra note 21, § 2.04.
23. Id. § 1.05.
24. The rules for “organizations” specified in the Organizational Guidelines, as well as in
Thompson, apply to partnerships as well as corporations. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 8B;
see also Thompson Memo, supra note 3.
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Between 1989 and 2002, the Supreme Court, in a series of five cases,
rejected multiple constitutional attacks on the guidelines.25 But on January
12, 2005, in United States v. Booker, a divided Court ruled that the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines for individuals were unconstitutional.26 Booker
contained two separate majority opinions, one authored by Justice Stevens
and a second authored by Justice Breyer.27 The mandatory nature of the
guidelines, the Stevens majority concluded, deprived individual defendants
of their Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.28 The Supreme Court,
however, has never clearly addressed the question of whether a corporation
has a Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.29 It is possible that the Supreme
Court, when faced with the issue of a corporation’s right to a jury trial,
might well conclude that corporations are not protected by the Sixth
Amendment. In that event, the Booker infirmity would not extend to the
Organizational Guidelines.
However, under the Breyer majority, if Booker is applied to
corporations, the Organizational Guidelines would simply become advisory
rather than mandatory.30 In any event, the Organizational Guidelines will
remain of continuing importance. The guidelines have been a major factor
in the development of the law and practice of corporate compliance and it is

25. See Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 569 (2002); United States v. Watts, 519 U.S.
148, 149 (1997); Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 386 (1995); United States v. Dunnigan, 507
U.S. 87, 88–89 (1993); Mistretta v. United States, 488 US 361, 372 (1989).
26. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
27. The opinion on the question of the constitutionality of the guidelines was written by Justice
Stevens and joined by Justices Scalia, Souter, Thomas and Ginsburg. The Stevens majority
concluded that the Sixth Amendment prohibits a judge from increasing a sentence beyond the
sentence that could have been imposed solely based upon facts found by the jury or admitted by
the defendant. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines require judges to sentence criminal defendants
based on numerous factors, many of which may not be considered by a jury. The Stevens majority
thus held that the Sentencing Guidelines violate the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a jury trial in
criminal cases. See id. The second opinion, regarding the appropriate remedy, was delivered by
Justice Breyer and joined by Justices O’Connor, Kennedy and Ginsburg and Chief Justice
Rehnquist. Justice Ginsburg thus provided the fifth vote on both issues. The Breyer majority
concluded that the two provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act must be excised to make the
guidelines constitutional—(i) the statutory requirement that sentencing courts must impose a
sentence within the applicable guidelines range, absent circumstances justifying a departure; and
(ii) the statutory provision which establishes standards of review on appeal, including de novo
review of departures from the applicable guidelines range. The Breyer majority held that, despite
the unconstitutionality of the mandatory nature of the guidelines, the guidelines should
nonetheless remain in place as advisory. With respect to appeals, the Court held that the
appropriate standard of review for appeals from sentences rendered under the new system
articulated by the Court in Booker is review for “unreasonableness.” Id. at 259–61.
28. See id. at 235–36.
29. See Peter J. Henning, The Conundrum Of Corporate Criminal Liability: Seeking A
Consistent Approach To The Constitutional Rights Of Corporations In Criminal Prosecutions, 63
TENN. L. REV. 793, 866–75 (1996) (tracing the history of the Supreme Court’s decisions bearing
on a corporation’s right to a jury trial).
30. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 220.
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likely that they will continue to have an impact on corporate governance.31
Moreover, the alternative corporate sanctions embodied in the guidelines
appear not as conditions of a criminal sentence imposed by a judge, but as
agreed upon provisions of corporate deferred prosecution and nonprosecution agreements negotiated between putative corporate defendants
and the Justice Department.32
B. SARBANES-OXLEY
Extraordinary and unprecedented episodes of corporate wrongdoing
burst upon the national scene in 2002. Senior executives of Enron, Arthur
Andersen, Tyco, Global Crossing, ImClone, Adelphia, and MCI-WorldCom
were charged with serious misconduct.33 In response, Federal Reserve
Chairman, Alan Greenspan condemned a “corporate culture” of “infectious
greed.”34
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (Sarbanes-Oxley), Congress’s response to
these corporate scandals, was swift and shows the haste of its drafters.35 The
vast bulk of the provisions outlined in Sarbanes-Oxley address SEC
enforcement, accounting, and corporate governance, not criminal law.36
31. See, e.g., In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996)
(discussing the effects of the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines may have on corporate
governance).
32. See infra Tables I & II.
33. See LEONARD ORLAND, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY: REGULATION AND
COMPLIANCE § 4.01 (2004).
34. See Fed Chief Rips Corporate Misconduct, WALL ST. J., July 17, 2002; see also FRANK
PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED: HOW DECEIT AND RISK CORRUPTED THE FINANCIAL MARKETS
190 (2003) (“An infectious greed seemed to grip much of our business community.” (quoting
Alan Greenspan to the Banking Committee in 2002)). In the aftermath of the dramatic Enron and
WorldCom failures, the American Bar Association created a Task Force on Corporate
Responsibility to “examine systemic issues relating to corporate responsibility arising out of
Enron and Enron-like situations which have shaken investor confidence.” James H. Cheek, III,
Chair, The Task Force on Corporate Responsibility, ABA Resolution, Adopted by the House of
Delegates 3 (Aug. 11–12, 2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/leadership/2003/
journal/119c.pdf. See also N.Y.S.E., Corporate Accountability and Listing Standards Committee 1
(June 6, 2002), available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/corp_govreport.pdf. “[I]n the aftermath of
the ‘meltdown’ of significant companies due to failures of diligence, ethics and controls,” the New
York Stock Exchange Corporate Accountability and Listing Standards Committee promulgated
rigorous new rules “to raise corporate governance and disclose standards.” Id.
35. On July 25, 2002, WorldCom disclosed a $3.85 billion accounting restatement. The same
month, a bill offered by Senator Paul Sarbanes was passed by the Senate by a vote of 97-0. Within
ten days, a House-Senate Conference Committee agreed on the bill, and by month’s end, Congress
enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which the President sighed on July 30, 2002. See ORLAND, supra
note 33, § 4.01.
36. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act restructures the regulation of accounting through the creation of a
new Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, under the SEC, with broad investigatory and
enforcement powers. Sarbanes-Oxley also imposes new restrictions on the practice of accounting
and reforms corporate governance and disclosure by mandating prompt corporate disclosure of
material changes in corporate financial conditions and sharply limiting corporate loans to
executives. The Act also requires the SEC to promulgate rules for professional conduct of
accountants and lawyers. The statute reforms the corporate civil litigative process by extending
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However, Sarbanes-Oxley also contains a number of important criminal
provisions which create new criminal offenses37 and increase the penalties
for preexisting and newly created crimes.38 These new Sarbanes-Oxley
criminal prohibitions and penalties appear to apply only to individuals, not
corporate entities.39 Sarbanes-Oxley fails to address rules for determining
entity liability and does not establish new or increased entity criminal
sanctions.
Since the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley, corporate criminal
prosecutions and convictions continue to be a major focus of the Justice
Department, spearheaded by the Justice Department’s Corporate Fraud
Task Force.40 The Task Force’s efforts have resulted in a large number of
indictments and convictions of corporate executives including executives of
Enron, MCI-WorldCom, Adelphia, Rite-Aid, and HealthSouth, all of which
were the focus of sustained public attention.41
the statute of limitations for securities fraud cases and establishing broad new protection for
whistle-blowers. The Act also creates new criminal offenses with substantial penalties, increases
maximum penalties for preexisting crimes, broadens the offense of document destruction and
doubles the maximum penalties for that offense. The Act requires chief executive and financial
officers to certify financial results and imposes substantial penalties for misleading certifications.
See id. §§ 4.03, 4.06.
37. See id. § 4.06[C].
38. See id. § 4.06[B].
39. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 8–11, 15 U.S.C. § 7201 (Supp. II 2002).
40. The Justice Department Corporate Fraud Task Force, created by executive order in 2002,
has as its mandate to “investigate and prosecute significant financial crimes, recover the proceeds
of such crimes, and ensure just and effective punishment of those who perpetrate financial
crimes.” Exec. Order No. 13271, 67 Fed. Reg. 46,091 (2002) (Establishment of the Corporate
Fraud Task Force); see also SECOND YEAR REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: CORPORATE FRAUD
TASK FORCE (July 20, 2004), reprinted in CORPORATE COUNSEL FORUM 2005: WHAT YOU NEED
TO KNOW ABOUT CORPORATE LIABILITY & GOVERNMENT ENFORCEMENT 545 (Michael E.
Horowitz & Leonard Orland eds. 2005).
41. Between March 2003 and July 2004, federal prosecutors filed criminal charges
relating to nineteen major corporate fraud scandals. . . . The charges were filed in sixtynine separate but often related prosecutions naming more than a hundred twenty-five
defendants . . . . During the same time frame, prosecutors successfully concluded cases
against two-thirds of the defendants. With the exception of four acquittals and two
dismissals, all of the dispositions . . . are either guilty pleas or jury convictions.
Kathleen F. Brickey, Enron’s Legacy, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 221, 246 (2004–2005) (citations
omitted). The Chairman of the Corporate Fraud Task Force summarized the results in these terms:
[S]ince the inception of the Task Force through May 31st of this year [2004], Justice
Department prosecutors, working hand-in-hand with regulatory Task Force members,
and investigators from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Internal Revenue
Service’s Criminal Investigation division, and the U.S. Postal Inspection service have:
(1) Obtained over 500 corporate fraud convictions or guilty pleas. (2) Charged over 900
defendants and over 60 corporate CEOs and presidents with some type of corporate
fraud crime in connection with over 400 charged cases. . . .
SECOND YEAR REPORT, supra note 40, at 549. Many of the prosecutions in the 2004 period arise
from major corporate scandals. For example, Adelphi generated several prosecutions, Enron
thirty-one prosecutions, HealthSouth nearly twenty prosecutions and WorldCom six prosecutions.
Substantively, the major statutes most frequently invoked were conspiracy, securities fraud, wire
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The most important post-Sarbanes-Oxley development has been the
proliferation of corporate deferred prosecution and non-prosecution
agreements, coupled with indictments of senior management, including
Chief Executive Officers, Chief Financial Officers, and General Counsels,
of the corporations that were the beneficiaries of the corporate
agreements.42 Consequently, the focus of corporate criminal prosecution
shifted from the corporate entity to the corporate executive.
III. TRANSFORMATIVE CHANGE: THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT
AND THE THOMPSON MEMO
A. PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
Discretionary decision-making permeates the American system of
criminal justice. The discretionary power to prosecute or to decline
prosecution “has traditionally been exercised sub rosa and on an ad hoc
basis, and has thus remained largely unstructured.”43 “[P]rosecutors are not
held to anything remotely like what due process would require if they were
engaged in an acknowledged rather than a hidden system of adjudication.”44
Prosecutors enjoy a unique position in the American criminal justice system
since their decisions to prosecute, or not to prosecute, are not subject to
judicial review. As Judge Richard Posner explains:
A judge in our system does not have the authority to tell prosecutors
which crimes to prosecute or when to prosecute them. Prosecutorial
discretion resides in the executive, not the judicial branch, and that
discretion, though subject of course to judicial review to protect
constitutional rights, is not reviewable for a simple abuse of discretion.45

Repeatedly, the Supreme Court has reinforced this immunity from
judicial review:
[T]he decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review.
Such factors as the strength of the [government’s] case, the prosecution’s
general deterrence value, the Government’s enforcement priorities, and the
case’s relationship to the Government’s overall enforcement plan are not

fraud, false books and records, false statements, mail fraud, obstruction of justice, insider trading,
money laundering and tax fraud. See id. at 558–59.
42. See infra Tables I & II.
43. Wayne R. LaFave, The Prosecutor’s Discretion in the United States, 18 AM. J. COMP. 532,
537 (1970).
44. James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Discretion, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521,
1554–55 (1981).
45. United States v. Giannattasio, 979 F.2d 98, 100 (7th Cir. 1992).
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readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to
undertake.46

All prosecutors, state and federal, exercise considerable discretion;
however, federal prosecutors exercise a much broader discretion than their
state counterparts.47 Under the theory of respondeat superior, the very
nature of corporate crime further enhances federal prosecutorial discretion.
That is, if a corporate executive or employee violates the criminal law to
benefit the corporation, the vicarious liability of the corporate entity for that
conduct is virtually automatic. Moreover, most corporate criminal conduct,
in addition to violating the criminal law, also violates administrative and
civil regulatory processes. This confluence of criminal and civil regulatory
systems thrusts upon the federal prosecutors unusual discretionary powers
regarding whether the corporation, as well as corporate individuals, should
be prosecuted.48 This factor imposes onto the federal prosecutors the special
responsibility of carefully weighing the adequacy of available non-penal
remedies before deciding whether or not to indict the corporation.49
The very threat of corporate indictment enables federal prosecutors to
achieve far-reaching and otherwise unattainable comprehensive settlements
not only by deciding to prosecute but also by deciding not to prosecute,
either by declining or deferring prosecution.
B. STRUCTURING PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN CORPORATE
CRIME CASES
For some time, the Justice Department has articulated general principles
to guide United States Attorneys in the exercise of their discretion.50 In
2000, the Justice Department refined its prosecutorial priorities in corporate
crime cases with the Holder Memorandum, Federal Prosecution of
Corporations, designed to “provide[ ] guidance as to what factors should
generally inform a prosecutor in making the decision whether to charge a
corporation.”51 Holder was revised in 2003; its successor was Thompson.52
A former United States Attorney explained the crux of the 2003 revision:
Mr. Thompson’s revision of the Holder Memorandum makes clear that a
number of changes have been made in direct response to the recent spate
of corporate fraud cases. . . . [T]he recent modifications to these guidelines

46. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985). See also United States v. Batchelder,
442 U.S. 114, 115 (1979) (“Whether to prosecute and what charge to file . . . are decisions that
generally rest in the prosecutor’s discretion.”).
47. See Gerald Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV.
2117, 2136–37 (1998).
48. See ORLAND, supra note 33, § 6.02.
49. See id.
50. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATT’Y MANUAL 9-27.000 (2006) [hereinafter U.S.A.M.].
51. Holder Memo, supra note 2.
52. See Thompson Memo, supra note 3.
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make clear that a corporation seeking to avoid federal prosecution through
cooperation may have a tougher row to hoe.53

Under Thompson, the Justice Department’s central focus when deciding
whether or not to prosecute a corporation is an appraisal of the extent of the
corporation’s cooperation with the government.54 “Cooperation” is
frequently interpreted by the Justice Department to involve waiver of
privilege and assistance in prosecuting corporate executives.55
Thompson enumerates nine specific factors which “prosecutors should
consider . . . in reaching a decision as to the proper treatment of a corporate
target.”56 The factors are:
1.
2.

3.
4.

5.
6.

7.

8.
9.

the nature and seriousness of the offense . . .
the pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the corporation, including the
complicity in, or condonation of, the wrongdoing by corporate
management . . .
the corporation’s history of similar conduct, including prior criminal, civil,
and regulatory enforcement actions taken against it . . .
the corporation’s timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its
willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its agents, including, if
necessary, the waiver of corporate attorney-client and work product
protection . . .
the existence and adequacy of the corporation’s compliance program . . .
the corporation’s remedial actions, including any efforts to implement an
effective compliance program or to improve an existing one, to replace
responsible management, to discipline or terminate wrongdoers, to pay
restitution, and to cooperate with the relevant government agencies . . .
collateral consequences, including disproportionate harm to shareholders,
pension holders and employees not proven personally culpable and impact
on the public arising from the prosecution . . .
the adequacy of the prosecution of individuals responsible for the
corporation’s malfeasance . . .
the adequacy of remedies such as civil or regulatory enforcement
actions.57

53. Vinegrad, supra note 3.
54. See Thompson Memo, supra note 3. The Thompson Memo states:
The main focus of the revisions is increased emphasis on and scrutiny of the
authenticity of the corporation’s cooperation. Too often business organizations, while
purporting to cooperate with a Department investigation, in fact take steps to impede
the quick and effective exposure of the complete scope of wrongdoing under
investigation.
Id.

55. See, e.g., id.
56. Thompson Memo, supra note 3.
57. Id.
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Thompson also declares that: “In gauging the extent of the
corporation’s cooperation, the prosecutor may consider the corporation’s
willingness . . . to waive attorney-client and work product protection.”58
Beyond its initial purpose of guiding the decision whether or not to
indict the corporation, Thompson, combined with the Organizational
Guidelines, has become a blueprint for the restrictions embodied in deferred
and non-prosecution agreements.
IV. TRANSFORMATIVE CHANGE: THE JUSTICE
DEPARTMENT, DEFERRED PROSECUTION
AND NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS
A. VARIETIES OF ALTERNATIVES TO PROSECUTION
The Justice Department has a “wide-array of options available” once it
concludes that there is sufficient evidence to bring a case against a
corporate entity. Christopher J. Christie, the United States Attorney for the
District of New Jersey explains the options available to the government in
these terms: “Corporate fraud cases present prosecutors with a particularly
complex mix of considerations to analyze and ultimately balance in order to
appropriately resolve allegations of corporate wrongdoing. The range of
options available to prosecutors in the corporate context is broad.”59
The charging options available to the Department are:
1. “Proceed with the prosecution by seeking an indictment or entering
into a plea agreement with the company;”
2. “Decline to prosecute the company on public-policy grounds
(‘declination of prosecution’);”
3. “Enter into a deferred prosecution agreement with the company; or”
4. “Enter into a non-prosecution agreement with the company.”60
For the corporation under criminal investigation by the Justice
Department, the choice of options is potentially “the difference between life
and death for a corporation.”61 A corporate indictment is a highly publicized
event and a corporate plea agreement is subject to public judicial control. In
contrast, a declination of prosecution is rarely accompanied by a public
announcement from the Justice Department. When the Justice Department
58. Id.
59. Christopher J. Christie & Robert M. Hanna, A Push Down the Road of Good Corporate
Citizenship: The Deferred Prosecution Agreement Between the U.S. Attorney for the District of
New Jersey and Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1043, 1043 (2006).
60. F. Joseph Warin & Peter E. Jaffe, The Deferred-Prosecution Jigsaw Puzzle: A Modest
Proposal For Reform, ANDREWS LITIGATION REPORTER: WHITE COLLAR CRIME, Sept. 2005,
at 3.
61. Christopher A. Wray, Assistant Attorney Gen., Criminal Div., Prepared Remarks to the
Ass’n of Certified Fraud Examiners, Mid-South Chapter (Sept. 2, 2004), available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/press_room/speeches/2004_2954_rmks2CFC_TN090204.pdf.
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goes beyond simple declination and enters into a formal non-prosecution
agreement, that agreement is frequently, but not universally, made public.
The most formal of federal alternatives to corporate indictment is the
deferred prosecution agreement. The indictment or information remains
open during the deferral period.
The basic difference between a deferred prosecution agreement and a
non-prosecution agreement centers on the contingent threat to the
corporation in the event of a perceived violation of the agreement:
In a [non-prosecution agreement], no charge is filed in court, but the
government can still file and prosecute a charge later if the company
violates the terms of the deal. In a [deferred prosecution agreement], the
government files the criminal charge in court but doesn’t prosecute the
claim. If the company abides by the terms of the DPA, the government
dismisses the charge when the agreement expires. If not, the government
can prosecute the already-filed charge.62

“In contrast to the far more rigid sentencing process,” United States
Attorney Christie explains:
[D]eferred prosecution agreements allow prosecutors and companies to
work together in creative and flexible ways to remedy past problems and
set the corporation on the road of good corporate citizenship. They also
permit us[, the government,] to achieve more than we could through courtimposed fines or restitution alone. These agreements, with their broad
range of reform tools permit remedies beyond the scope of what a court
could achieve after a criminal conviction.63

B. THE RISE OF DEFERRED PROSECUTION AND NON-PROSECUTION
AGREEMENTS
Since 1993, the Justice Department has resolved corporate criminal
investigations not by issuance of an indictment, but by entry into corporate
deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements.

62. Sue Reisinger, By Any Other Name . . ., CORP. COUNS., Sept. 19, 2006. On occasion, it is
difficult to determine if an “agreement” is a deferred prosecution or non-prosecution agreement.
For example, Prudential Financial, Inc. signed “what it thought was a non-prosecution agreement”
ending a three year probe into illegal mutual fund activity committed by its Prudential Equity
Group. Id. However, Deputy Attorney General Paul McNulty describes the agreement as a
deferred prosecution agreement. See id.; Deputy Attorney Gen. Paul J. McNulty, Remarks at Press
Conference Regarding Prudential Equity Group Securities Fraud Allegations, Washington, D.C.
(Aug. 28, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj/dag/speech/2006/dag_speech_060828.htm. In fact,
the language of the agreement reflects the harsher penalties typically seen in deferred prosecution
agreements, yet, like non-prosecution agreements, no charges were filed or pending against
Prudential.
63. Christie & Hanna, supra note 59, at 1043.
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TABLE A. NUMBER OF FEDERAL NON-PROSECUTION AND
DEFERRED PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS FILED
YEAR
1993
1994
1995
1996
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006

NONPROSECUTIONS
3
1
2
1
1
0
2
1
6
3

DEFERRED
PROSECUTIONS
1
1
0
1
1
1
4
5
4
6

TOTALS

20

24

These non-prosecution and deferred prosecution agreements are
complex and constitute a sea change in the way the federal government
responds to perceived serious corporate misconduct. An understanding of
this development requires examination not of statutes, cases, or regulations,
but of the negotiated agreements themselves.
Deferred prosecutions, by utilizing statutory or judicially crafted
pretrial diversion programs, are commonplace in state judicial decisions.64
Deferred prosecution is also explicitly authorized by both a federal statute65
and the United States Attorneys’ Manual.66 Pretrial diversion and deferred
prosecution, under these programs, are typically crafted for first offender
street criminals, and, historically, have rarely been used for white collar
offenders. Indeed, prior to 1993, deferred prosecution had not been used to
resolve federal criminal charges against corporations. The genesis of the
current proliferation of deferred and non-prosecution agreements in
corporate criminal law may be traced to two important settlements in the
Southern District of New York in the 1990s involving Salomon Brothers
and Prudential Securities.

64. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL AND NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§ 13.1(d) (4th ed. 2004).
65. See Speedy Trial Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-619, §§ 3152–3154, 88 Stat. 2076, 2086–88
(1975) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3152–3154 (2000)).
66. U.S.A.M. 9-22.010 (1997).
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C. PROGENITORS: SALOMON BROTHERS AND PRUDENTIAL
SECURITIES
1. Salomon Brothers
The government charged Salomon Brothers, a primary dealer in
Treasury Notes, with engaging in a conspiracy to coordinate trading activity
in Treasury notes in order to affect prices in the secondary and financing
markets.67 The company submitted false bids and subverted notes to
circumvent the Treasury Department’s 35% cap for single buyer purchases
of notes. The misconduct resulted in the criminal prosecution of one senior
executive, the resignation of another senior executive, and civil actions
against the entity, which were then settled by the SEC and Antitrust
Division consent decrees.
No criminal charges were brought against Salomon Brothers. Despite
the absence of a formal agreement by the government not to prosecute, the
disposition of the charges against Salomon contained the basic components
of future formal agreements, including:
1. The indictment and conviction of a senior manager;68
2. The resignation, under pressure, of senior management, including
Salomon’s President and Chief Executive Officer;69
3. Civil settlements with the SEC and the Antitrust Division, which
imposed a total of $290 million in sanctions, forfeitures and
restitution, (which include $122 million in civil penalties, $50
million in forfeitures, $18 million in restitution, and $100 million to
fund claims and costs);
4. An appointment of an administrator to direct the restitution
compensation fund;
5. Cooperation with the government investigation, including
disclosure of the corporation’s internal investigation;
6. An obligation to continue cooperation with the government
investigations;
7. And the institution of corporate reforms to prevent recurrence of the
violation.70

67. ORLAND, supra note 33, § 6.06[A]. See also Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Department
of Justice and SEC Enter $290 Million Settlement with Salomon Brothers in Treasury Securities
Case (May 20, 1992), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_releases/1992/
211182.htm.
68. Paul Mozer, head of Salomon’s government bond trading desk, pled guilty to making false
statements to the government and spent four months in prison. Mozer also paid $1.1 million in
civil penalties to the SEC. See ORLAND, supra note 33, § 6.06[A] (citing Letter from U.S.
Attorney’s Office, Southern District of New York to Honorable Pierre N. Leval, Dec. 10, 1993).
69. Mozer’s superior, John Meriwether, and Salomon’s Chief Executive Officer both resigned
under pressure. Id. (citing Letter from U.S. Attorney’s Office, Southern District of New York to
Honorable Pierre N. Leval, Dec. 10, 1993).
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In a press release, United States Attorney Otto Obermaier stressed
Salomon Brothers’ undertakings for reform and the sanctions imposed. He
explained that:
Salomon had cooperated extensively in the investigation and had taken
decisive and extraordinary actions to restructure its management to avoid
future misconduct. The cooperation included providing detailed
information concerning the firm’s own internal investigation, turning over
documents and making employees available for interviews and
testimony. . . .“Such actions are virtually unprecedented in my
experience.”71

2. Prudential Securities
The 1994 deferred prosecution agreement entered into by Mary Jo
White, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, and
Prudential Securities is the nation’s first comprehensive formal federal
corporate deferred prosecution agreement. The Prudential agreement, in
many respects, has become the blueprint for subsequent deferred
prosecution and non-prosecution agreements.72 The agreement arose from a
criminal complaint charging Prudential Securities with a violation of
§ 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act by fraudulently selling $1.4
billion worth of limited partnerships in oil and gas.73
Notwithstanding the seriousness of the charges, the United States
Attorney announced an agreement to defer prosecution for a period of three
years. In that agreement, Prudential undertook important corporate
restructuring and established extraordinary internal monitoring
mechanisms, including the appointment of an experienced former Federal
Judge as an outside director and ombudsman with reporting responsibilities
not only to the Prudential Board, but also to the United States Attorney.
Specifically, under the Deferred Prosecution Agreement, Prudential had the
following obligations:
1. Payment of $330 million into a special fund established by the SEC
for investors who purchased the Prudential oil and gas limited
partnerships with any fund in excess of investor claims to be paid to
the United States and an additional sum of $330 million to
compensate innocent investors.
2. The installation of an independent “ombudsman” to receive
allegations of misconduct by any Prudential employee and to file
70. Id.
71. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, supra note 67 (quoting Otto Obermaier, United States
Attorney for the Southern District of New York).
72. See Letter from Mary Jo White, U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, to
Scott W. Muller & Carey R. Dunne, Counsel for Prudential Sec. Inc. (Oct. 27, 1994). See also
ORLAND supra note 34, § 6.06[A], [B].
73. See ORLAND, supra note 33, § 6.06[B].
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quarterly reports with the United States Attorney of any such
allegations. (Former Federal Judge Kenneth Conboy was appointed
ombudsman).
The retention of an independent law firm acceptable to the
government to review Prudential’s policies and procedures to
determine the adequacy of its regulatory and compliance controls.
(Allen Levensen, a senior partner in Fulbright and Jaworski was
selected).
Full and truthful cooperation in any criminal investigation,
including voluntarily providing any requested records and
unlimited access to Prudential’s facilities, documents, and
employees.
Undertakings by Prudential’s parent groups to take appropriate
steps to further Prudential’s compliance.
Public acknowledgment by Prudential of its wrongdoing.74

In announcing the Deferred Prosecution Agreement, Ms. White spoke
in terms generally applicable to the scores of deferred prosecution and nonprosecution agreements formed after Prudential:
The public interest is well served by this agreement. Upon conviction, a
corporation cannot be sentenced to jail, but only to pay restitution, fines
and adopt measures aimed at enhancing internal controls to prevent and
detect wrongdoing. This agreement imposes such sanctions. It will insure
restitution of over $660 million to defrauded investors and cause
Prudential, through the appointment of an ombudsman and other measures
to adhere to the highest ethical and legal standards in its dealings with
customers and regulatory authorities. If Prudential fulfills all of its
obligations under the agreement, further prosecution will be
unnecessary.75

D. THE PROLIFERATION OF DEFERRED PROSECUTION AND NONPROSECUTION AGREEMENTS
In the past five years, an increasing number of corporations have
entered into deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements.76 These
74. Id.; see also Letter from Mary Jo White, supra note 72.
75. ORLAND, supra note 33, § 6.06[B] (citing Mary Jo White).
76. At the same time, a substantial number of corporate executives have been indicted and
convicted of serious corporate crimes and have received lengthy prison sentences. Although there
were several acquittals—notably Mark Belnick, former General Counsel of Tyco and Richard
Scrushy, former CEO of HealthSouth Senior—executives in the major corporate fraud cases
received were convicted and received substantial prison sentences. Bernard Ebbers, former CEO
of WorldCom was sentenced to 25 years imprisonment; John Rigas, founder of Adelphia was
sentenced to fifteen years incarceration—Judge Leonard Sand said the sentence would have been
longer but for the defendant’s health and age; Judge Sand sentenced Rigas’s son, Timothy Rigas,
to twenty years incarceration; Tyco’s former CEO, L. Dennis Kozlowski, and CFO Mark Swartz
were convicted of state criminal charges; Andrew Fastow, former CFO of Enron, pled guilty to
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agreements are modeled, in many respects, after the Prudential
Agreement—the entity accepts responsibility for its misconduct, agrees to
cooperate with the government, undertakes corporate reforms and agrees to
pay substantial fines and restitution.
There is a “growing recognition by corporate management of the risk
and the need to settle with the government and the increased perception on
the part of the government that corporate indictments and convictions can
be overkill.”77 From the government’s point of view, deferred prosecutions
facilitate corporate cooperation while reducing the uncertainty for
employees and investors of a continuing unresolved criminal investigation.78 Deferred prosecution allows prosecutors to “send a message that
certain corporate conduct won’t be tolerated without risking the viability of
the company or the business.”79
The message of the increasing use of deferred corporate prosecution
agreements, coupled with the disintegration and corporate death of Arthur
Andersen is clear: corporations faced with serious wrongdoing by corporate
executives must promptly accept full responsibility, discipline wrongdoers,
institute serious institutional reform and fully cooperate with the government. Increasingly, corporations must also waive the attorney-client
privilege and agree not to contradict a detailed factual statement
documenting the entity’s culpability.80 If an organization complies, it may
escape organizational indictment. If it does not, it faces the risk of
indictment, conviction and corporate death.81
multiple charges and received a ten year sentence (later reduced); Martin Grass, former CEO of
Rite-Aid Corp., received an eight year sentence; James Olis, former Vice President and Counsel of
Dynegy, received a twenty-four year sentence, which was reduced on appeal; Kirk Shelton,
former Vice-Chair of Cendant Corp., received a ten year sentence; Sam Waksal, former CEO of
ImClone, received a seven year sentence. See Guilty, Not-Guilty, Mistrial, WALL ST. J. ONLINE,
July 13, 2005; Erin McClam, ImClone Founder Wants Sentence Shortened, LATIMES.COM, Mar.
31, 2005; Former Executive of Cendant Receives 10-year Sentence, WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 2005, at
B2. Jeff Skilling, Enron’s former CEO received one of the longest sentences of any corporate
executive—24 years. John R. Emshwiller, Skilling Gets 24 Years in Prison, WALL ST. J., Oct. 24,
2006, at C1.
77. Kara Scannell, Firms Are Getting Time to Clean Up Their Acts—If Charge Could be
Deadly, Indictment Can be Deferred As Violators Effect Change, WALL ST. J., June 13, 2005,
at C3.
78. See Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur, Corporate Criminal Prosecution in a PostEnron World: The Thompson Memo in Theory and Practice, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1095,
1104–05 (2006).
79. Scannell, supra note 77 (quoting Robert Giuffra, partner at Sullivan & Cromwell Partner
who negotiated the Computer Associates International Inc. Deferred Prosecution Agreement).
80. See Leonard Post, Deferrals on Rise in Foreign Bribery, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 15, 2005, at 1;
Deborah Solomon & Anne Marie Squeo, Crackdown Puts Corporations, Executives in New Legal
Peril, WALL ST. J., June 20, 2005, at A1.
81. See Indictment, United States v. Milberg Weiss Bershad & Schulman LLP, David Bershad,
Steven Schulman, Seymour Lazar, and Paul T. Selzer, CR 05-587 (A) - DDP (C.D.C.A. 2006)
(indicting defendants for racketeering conspiracy, mail fraud, money laundering, subscribing to
false tax return, obstruction of justice, aiding and abetting and causing an act to be done, and
criminal forfeiture). See also infra text accompanying note 193.
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Arthur Andersen’s initial refusal to accept responsibility for its
misconduct is a primary reason for its indictment and conviction.82
Andersen, with a loosely structured leadership and no one clearly in charge,
was simply not prepared to promptly accept responsibility and fully
cooperate with the government by agreeing to major institutional reform.83
A corporation, or partnership, cannot obtain the benefit of deferred
prosecution without prompt acceptance of responsibility and complete
cooperation. As Philip Urofsky, the former Assistant Chief of the fraud
section of the Justice Department put it, “The bar has been pressing for
more clarity on when prosecution will be deferred.”84 Urofsky noted that
the Justice Department “would consider a deferred prosecution agreement
when the company had voluntarily disclosed the conduct, and where it
cooperated and undertook to continue cooperating in our investigation.”85
That “cooperation” could include making witnesses available, providing
documents voluntarily, disclosing the results and conclusions of their
internal investigation and, if necessary, waiving the privilege with respect
to contemporaneous legal advice, where advice of counsel is a potential
defense . . . . In addition, the company would have to turn over interview
and witness statements from its internal investigation, and show that it had
already taken remedial steps to put new compliance and financial controls
in place. The company would also have to discipline the wrongdoers. “The
decision to go the deferred prosecution route . . . may also turn on factors
such as the extent in dollars and duration of the misconduct, and the
involvement of senior management.”86

The Justice Department continues to see benefits from the deferred
prosecution agreements. “By and large, [deferred prosecution agreements
have] worked well. . . . We’ve been able to recover a lot of money for
victims without going through the delay and expense of a trial, and we’ve
seen some positive . . . internal reforms.”87
E. TWO MAJOR AGREEMENTS: COMPUTER ASSOCIATES AND
KPMG
While the Salomon Brothers and Prudential Securities
formed the model for scores of subsequent agreements,
settlements—Computer Associates and KPMG—illustrate an
common structure of deferred prosecution agreements.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

dispositions
two recent
increasingly
These two

See ORLAND, supra note 33, § 6.06[C].
See id.
Post, supra note 80 (quoting Philip Urofsky).
Id. (quoting Philip Urofsky).
Id. (quoting Philip Urofsky).
Greg Burns, Corporations Avoid Criminal Cases: Individuals prosecuted instead, avoiding
Andersen effect; policy too easy, critics Say, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 20, 2005, Business Section, at 1
(citing Timothy Coleman, senior counsel at the Justice Department).
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agreements are the clearest examples of the Justice Department’s ability to
achieve sweeping corporate concessions: in both cases, the entity entered
into a deferred prosecution agreement that includes cooperating in the
prosecution of the entity’s culpable corporate executives.
For a corporate executive facing potential criminal indictment, the
results of a deferred prosecution agreement can be ominous. Multiple
indictments of former senior managers accompanied both the Computer
Associates and KPMG deferred prosecution agreements.88 Both
corporations agreed to cooperate in those prosecutions. Under the terms of
the deferred prosecution agreement, Computer Associates discharged its
CEO and General Counsel and cooperated with the government in the
indictment of those key executives. KPMG currently is cooperating in the
criminal trials of its former senior executives.89
1. Computer Associates
In September of 2004, Computer Associates, faced with the stark
prospect of a corporate indictment for securities fraud and obstruction of
justice, entered into a deferred prosecution agreement.90 There were
parallels between the Computer Associates agreement and its predecessor,
the Prudential Securities agreement. Both agreements required the
acceptance of responsibility, restitution, internal reform, and substantial
compliance undertakings. Furthermore, both agreements included, as an
element of cooperation, the discharge of senior management combined with
extensive cooperation in the prosecution of those managers.91 However, the
Computer Associates agreement added a new element to the Prudential
form—an agreement to a lengthy statement of facts combined with a
covenant not to contradict that factual statement.92 This provision is an
increasingly common element of deferred prosecution agreements and is
also an important feature of the KPMG agreement considered below.
Specifically, the Computer Associates deferred prosecution agreement
enumerated the following undertakings:

88. See Mark Hamblett, Deferred Prosecution, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 25, 2006 (discussing the defense
motions filed by indicted KPMG partners).
89. See Jonathan D. Glater, Former Banker Pleads Guilty in Tax Shelter Case, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 12, 2005, at C2.
90. United States v. Computer Assoc. Int’l, Inc., No. 04-837 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2004)
(Deferred Prosecution Agreement), available at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/whitecollar/
wc_DPA/$FILE/DPA-CA.pdf [hereinafter Computer Associates Agreement].
91. See Id. Computer Associate’s CEO, Sanjay Kumar, Head of Worldwide Sales, Stephen
Richards, General Counsel, Steven Woghin, and Senior Vice President were indicted. Woghin
promptly pled guilty. Alex Berenson, Former Executives of Software Maker Indicted in Fraud,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2004, at A1. On November 2, 2006, Kumar was sentenced to twelve years
in prison and fined $8 million. William M. Bulkeley, Former CA Chief Is Sentenced to 12-Year
Term, Fined, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 2006, at A1.
92. Computer Associates Agreement, supra note 90, at 2–3.
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1. Acknowledgment of Wrongdoing: In a comprehensive acknowledgment of wrongdoing, a detailed information and an extensive Stipulation of
Facts, Computer Associates acknowledged that it and certain executives
and officers filed false and misleading financial reports with the SEC and
obstructed investigations by a federal grand jury and the SEC.93
2. Payments: The company agreed to substantial payments consisting
of $225 million in restitution, issuance of stock, and cash payments of $163
million to compensate shareholders in four shareholder class actions.94
3. Remedial Actions: Computer Associates agreed to the termination
of executives, including terminating culpable officers and employees,
officers and employees who refused to cooperate in the internal
investigation “or otherwise took steps to obstruct or impede that
investigation.” The firm also agreed to appoint new management, including
a new Chief Executive Officer, Chief Operating Officer, Chief Financial
Officer, Head of Worldwide Sales and a new General Counsel.95
4. Continuing Cooperation: The agreement contained provisions for
ongoing disclosure to investigators, providing documents and records, and
making best efforts to make present and former employees available to
investigators. Additionally, the agreement stipulated that Computer
Associates would be “providing active assistance” in any “investigation,
criminal prosecution, civil trial or other legal proceeding” including
proceedings to “obtain disgorgement” of compensation to any current or
former employee. Computer Associates also undertook to continue
cooperation after the expiration of the agreement.96
5. Waiver of Privilege: The entity agreed not to assert, in any
government investigation “any claims of attorney-client or attorney work
product” privileges.97
6. Appointment of an Independent Examiner: The Examiner has broad
specified responsibilities for corporate reform. Computer Associates also
agreed to the addition of new independent directors;98 the establishment of a
compliance committee and a new disclosure committee; establishment of
“enhanced corporate governance procedures” to improve communications;
and the establishment of a comprehensive compliance and ethics program,
including the appointment of a “senior-level Chief Compliance Officer”;
reorganization of the firms Finance Department, and Internal Audit
Department.99
93. See id. at 2.
94. See id. at 2–3. The restitution fund administrator’s cost will be born by the entity, not the
restitution fund. Id.
95. Id. at 4.
96. Id. at 6.
97. Computer Associates Agreement, supra note 90, at 5.
98. See id. at 9. Laura Unger, a former SEC commissioner is a designated outside director; at
least two-thirds of the board must be outside directors. See id. at 10.
99. Id. at 10–11.
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2. KPMG
In August 2005, KPMG faced potential criminal charges that it had
“participated in a scheme to defraud the IRS by devising, marketing, and
implementing fraudulent tax shelters . . . .”100 Moreover, the government
charged that a number of KPMG tax partners engaged in conduct that was
unlawful and fraudulent, including preparing fraudulent tax returns, drafting
fraudulent factual tax recitations, issuing false and fraudulent opinions,
actively taking steps to conceal true facts from the IRS, and impeding the
IRS by failing to produce relevant documents.101 The Justice Department
did not proceed with an indictment against KPMG. Instead, the Department
and KPMG entered into a comprehensive deferred prosecution agreement102
that paralleled, in many respects, the Computer Associates agreement.103
Specific provisions of the KPMG agreement include:
1. Payments of $456 million: The KPMG agreement called for a fine
consisting of disgorgement of $128 million in fees, restitution to the IRS of
$228 million, and an IRS penalty of $100 million.104
2. Cooperation and Waiver of Privilege: The agreement required that
“cooperation with the criminal investigation” was “an important and
material factor” as was “not asserting . . . any claim of privilege (including
but not limited to the attorney-client and the work product protection).”105
3. Permanent Restrictions of and Elevated Standards for KPMG’s Tax
Practice Cooperation.
4. Establishment of a New Compliance Program: KPMG must institute
a compliance and ethics program “that fully comports with the criteria set
forth in Section 8B2.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines.”106 The
“maint[enance of] a permanent compliance office and a permanent
educational and training program” were also essential to the agreement.107

100. Information at ¶ 8, United States v. KPMG (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2005), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/August05/kpmginformation.pdf.
101. Id. at ¶ 8– 10.
102. See Deferred Prosecution Agreement, Letter from David N. Kelley, U.S. Attorney for the
Southern District of New York, to Robert S. Bennett, Esq., Attorney for KPMG (Aug. 26, 2005),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/August05/kpmgdpagmt.pdf [hereinafter
KPMG DPA] (requiring KPMG to secure an independent monitor and to turn over other
information). See also Jonathon Weil, KPMG’s Settlement Provides for New Start, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 29, 2005, at C1.
103. For a discussion of the Computer Associates agreement, see Computer Associates
Agreement, supra note 90.
104. See KPMG DPA, supra note 102, at 2–3. KPMG agrees that no portion of this amount is
deductible on any tax return and that the government will receive 50% of any reimbursement
under any insurance policy. Id. at 3–4.
105. Id. at 9–11. KPMG secured an exception to the privilege waiver issue to allow protection
of some advice given by its counsel as well as in private civil litigation. Id.
106. Id. at 17.
107. Id.
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5. Independent Monitor: “KPMG agrees to oversight and monitoring
by a government appointed monitor.”108
6. Agreement not to contradict the Statement of Facts: KPMG agrees
that “it shall not, through its attorneys, agents, partners, or employees, make
any statement, in litigation or otherwise, contradicting the Statement of
Facts or the representations in this agreement.” The agreement also stated
that “[a]ny such contradictory statement . . . shall constitute a breach of this
Agreement.”109
More than a dozen former KPMG partners have been indicted.110
Several filed motions to dismiss the indictments against them, or,
alternatively, to void portions of the KPMG Deferred Prosecution Agreement. One brief argued that KMPG’s Agreement with the government was
for the purpose of intimidating and influencing the firm and those working
for it.111 A brief by another defendant asserts that “by obligating KPMG and
its agents to testify favorably, and only favorably, for the Government, the

108. KPMG DPA, supra note 102, at 18. The agreement spells out, in detail, the jurisdiction,
powers and oversight authority of the monitor. Compensation for the monitor is the responsibility
of KPMG. See id. at 19–25.
109. Id. at 16. KPMG may “avoid a finding of breach . . . by repudiating such statement” within
48 hours of notice of breach by the government. Id. at 17.
110. See Unsealed Indictment, United States v. Stein, 05 Crim. 0888 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2005),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/August05/kpmgindividualsind.pdf
(indicting eight former KPMG partners); see also Stephen Taub, Ex-CFO of KPMG among
10 Newly Indicted, CFO.COM, Oct. 18, 2005, available at http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/
5051982?f=related (noting that, at that time, the total number of people “facing counts that include
conspiracy to defraud the government, tax evasion, and obstruction of internal revenue laws” was
nineteen).
111. Defendant David Rivkin’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to
Dismiss Indictment or Alternatively Void Portions of the KPMG Deferred Prosecution
Agreement, to Disclose Grand Jury Transcripts and Instructions to Grand Jury Regarding Venue,
and to Join Motions of Codefendants at 4, United States v. Stein, 05 Crim. 0888 (Jan. 12, 2006).
The brief argues:
The appropriate sanction for this violation [of due process] is dismissal of the
indictment. At a minimum, this court should void the deferred prosecution agreement
and compel KPMG to advise all of its employees in writing of this fact. Further, KPMG
should be ordered to admonish all of its employees to be completely truthful in any
statements they make, without regard to the Statement of Facts attached to the deferred
prosecution agreement.
Id. at 5. Judge Kaplan denied the motions to dismiss the indictment or to invalidate the KPMG
deferred prosecution agreement but expressed concern about KPMG’s refusal to pay legal costs of
former partners. See Lynnley Browning, A Single Trial For 18 Named in Tax Shelters,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2006, at C3; see also Lynnley Browning, Judge Questions Clarity of
Prosecution’s Tax-Shelter Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2006, at C4. Judge Kaplan concluded that
“the government has a legitimate interest in seeing to it that KPMG not gain the benefit of
deferred prosecution, only to undermine its formal acceptance of guilt by making statements
inconsistent with it.” Hamblett, supra note 88.
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Department of Justice has irreparably distorted the fact-finding process and
ensured that the prosecution of this matter will result in a mock trial.”112
V. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: STOLT-NIELSEN AND BOEING
Two recent developments in the Justice Department’s handling of
corporate misconduct reflect a somewhat inconsistent approach to the most
basic elements of deferred and non-prosecution agreements—cooperation
and compliance.
A. STOLT-NIELSEN
In February 2003, shipping giant, Stolt-Nielsen (Stolt) entered into an
Amnesty Agreement with the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division to
avoid prosecution of charges stemming from a customer allocation
conspiracy with other shipping corporations.113 “Using the information
provided by Stolt and its executives . . . the Government secured guilty
pleas from Stolt’s co-conspirators, resulting in prison sentences for
individual executives at those companies and fines totaling $62 million.”114
The Justice Department’s quite formal amnesty program shares
common attributes with deferred and non-prosecution agreements. In both,
the entity avoids prosecution in exchange for cooperation and compliance
with the terms of the agreement.115 Indeed, the Justice Department
characterizes its agreement with Stolt as a “conditional leniency or nonprosecution agreement.”116
The Stolt Amnesty Agreement, which granted amnesty for criminal
customer and territorial allocations in violation of the Sherman Act, had
two core requirements. First, Stolt represented to the Justice Department
that it was making complete and accurate disclosure to the government.117
Stolt also represented that it had taken “‘prompt and effective action to
terminate its part in the anti-competitive activity being reported upon

112. Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant Jeffrey Eischeid’s Motion to Dismiss the
Indictment, at 2, United States v. Stein, 05 Crim. 0888 (Jan. 12, 2005). The brief also asserts that
the government’s “oppressive tactics violate long-established notions of ethical prosecutorial
conduct, and constitute plain violations of Eischeid’s rights under the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments.” Id. See also infra text accompanying note 189 (discussing Judge Kaplan’s
response to defense claims that KPMG, in cooperation with the government, had
unconstitutionally violated defendants’ Sixth Amendment right to counsel by refusing to advance
legal fees).
113. See Press Release, Stolt-Nielsen Transp. Group, Stolt-Nielsen Transp. Group Granted
Conditional Amnesty in Parcel Tanker and Inland Barge Investigations (Feb. 25, 2003), available
at http://www.sntg.com/news/pressreleases.asp?url=/PR/200302/893240_5.html.
114. Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. United States, 442 F.3d 177, 180 (3d Cir. 2006).
115. Id.
116. Answer of the U.S. to Petitions for Reh’g en Banc at 1, Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. United
States, No. 05-1480 (3d Cir. June 9, 2006) [hereinafter U.S. response to Stolt].
117. Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. United States, 352 F. Supp. 2d 553, 558 (E.D. Pa. 2005).
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discovery of the activity.’”118 In addition, Stolt agreed to cooperate fully
and completely with the Justice Department’s investigation and prosecution
of employees involved in illegal activities. This cooperation provision
required the company to give all information known to Stolt relating to the
anti-competitive activity being reported on.119
Less than two months later, the Justice Department revoked amnesty
and declared that it would proceed to indict Stolt.120 The basis for the
amnesty revocation was the Justice Department’s assertion that the
Company had misrepresented the date when it had ceased engaging in
unlawful activities.121 The Justice Department concluded that while Stolt
represented that it had ended its collusive activities upon learning of them
in March of 2002, in fact, Stolt’s criminal collusive conduct continued well
into the last half of 2002—well beyond the terminated date represented by
Stolt.122 The government declared:
[The Justice Department Antitrust] Division received evidence that
[Stolt] . . . had continued to meet with its competitors and participate in
the conspiracy for months after discovering it, and that [Stolt] had
withheld information about the true extent of the conspiracy.123

Stolt, in response to the renewed threat of indictment, sought to enjoin
the Justice Department from revoking the agreement and indicting the
corporation. The District Court granted injunctive relief.124 However, the
Third Circuit reversed125 and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.126

118. Id. (citing Agreement between the Department of Justice and Stolt).
119. See id. (referring to Agreement between the Department of Justice and Stolt).
120. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. Press Release, Stolt-Nielsen S.A. Reports Withdrawal of Amnesty by
Department of Justice (March 22, 2004).
121. See Stolt-Nielsen, 352 F.Supp.2d at 559.
122. See id.; see also James Bandler & John McKinnon, Stolt-Nielsen is Probed for Traffic with
Iran, WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 2002, at A3. The events became public fact in an article published in
the Wall Street Journal covering a lawsuit filed against Stolt by the company’s former general
counsel, who resigned after the company refused to take corrective action to correct misconduct
uncovered by the General Counsel. Id.
123. U.S. Response to Stolt, supra note 116, at 2.
124. Stolt-Nielsen, 352 F. Supp. 2d at 553–55.
125. Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. United States, 442 F.3d 177, 178 (3d Cir. 2006). The Third
Circuit held:
This case raises a significant constitutional question of first impression in this Circuit:
whether federal courts have authority, consistent with the separation of powers, to
enjoin the executive branch from filing an indictment. Although federal courts have this
authority in narrow circumstances, we conclude that this is not such a case and
therefore reverse the District Court’s judgment to the contrary.
Id. Then Judge Samuel Alito heard oral argument but was elevated to the Supreme Court and the
decision was filed by quorum of the panel. See id.
126. Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. United States, 75 U.S.L.W. 3235, 2006 U.S. LEXIS 8342 (U.S. Oct.
30, 2006) (No. 06-97).
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On September 6, 2006, Stolt was indicted on conspiracy charges
stemming from violations from the Sherman Act.127 The Third Circuit’s
decision to uphold the Justice Department’s power to revoke amnesty and
seek an indictment affirms that the Justice Department has full and
complete control over defining compliance, cooperation and violation of a
non-prosecution agreement which can trigger indictment.128 The Stolt
amnesty revocation constitutes clear evidence that the Justice Department is
fully prepared to indict entities who fail to meet the government’s criteria
for complete cooperation.129 The Third Circuit’s opinion in Stolt-Nielsen v.
United States makes clear that federal courts will not intervene in a Justice
Department decision to revoke a non-prosecution agreement and seek
indictment, noting:
[S]eparation-of-power concerns thus counsel against using the
extraordinary remedy of enjoining the Government from filing the
indictments . . . . [W]e are guided by other cases from the Supreme Court
and the Courts of Appeals that lead us to conclude that non-prosecution
agreements may not form the basis for enjoining indictments before they
issue.130

B. BOEING
A second recent development, the Boeing Non-Prosecution Agreement,
takes a strikingly different turn. On June 29, 2006, Boeing entered into a
non-prosecution agreement and an accompanying civil settlement with the
Justice Department to resolve the charges that Boeing had unlawfully
violated conflict of interest laws and had unlawfully handled its
competitors’ sensitive and trade secret information.131 More specifically:
Boeing has agreed to pay a total of $615 million dollars to resolve the
government’s investigations and claims relating to the company’s hiring
of the former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for
Acquisition and Management, Darleen A. Druyun, by its then Chief
Financial Officer, Michael Sears, and its handling of competitors
information in connection with the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle
(EELV) Program and certain NASA launch services contracts.132

127. Indictment, United States v. Stolt-Nielsen, No. 06-466 (E.D.P.A. Sept. 6, 2006), available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f218200/218212.htm [hereinafter Stolt-Nielsen Indictment].
128. See Stolt-Nielsen, 442 F.3d at 187 (noting both the government’s right to indict Stolt and
Stolt’s post indictment remedies).
129. See id.
130. Id. See also supra text accompanying note 46.
131. See Non-Prosecution Agreement between The Boeing Company and the United States
Attorney’s Offices for the Central District of California and the Eastern District of Virginia 1
(June 30, 2006), available at http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/documents/boeing2.pdf
[hereinafter Boeing Non-Prosecution Agreement].
132. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Boeing to Pay United States Record $615 Million to
Resolve Fraud Allegations, http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2006/June/06_civ_412.html (announcing
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At first glance, the Non-Prosecution Agreement between Boeing and
the Justice Department appears standard enough; it includes with the
requisite provisions dealing with financial penalties, compliance programs,
hotlines, reporting, cooperation and disclosures.133 However, on the crucial
issue of compliance and potential violations of the agreement, Boeing is the
beneficiary of provisions absent from other deferred prosecution and nonprosecution agreements.134
In a curious turn of events, functionally, one of the most interesting
provisions states that Boeing gets a pass on employee misconduct if that
conduct is not committed by a high level executive, as defined by Boeing.
Specifically, the agreement provides:
For purposes of determining compliance with this Agreement (as opposed
to legal responsibility), the commission of a Defined Offense by a Boeing
employee classified at a level below Executive Management as defined by
Boeing’s internal classification structure in place at the time of the
execution of this Agreement shall not be deemed to constitute the
commission of a Defined Offense by Boeing . . . .135

Hence, even if the misconduct of a non-designated Boeing employee
who is not designated by Boeing constitutes a crime, it nonetheless will not
constitute a violation of the Non-Prosecution Agreement.
John Coffee, a professor at Columbia University School of Law, was
quite right in concluding that “‘[d]rawing the line between executives and
other employees is a little crude.’”136 Professor Coffee also correctly
asserts: “‘[Y]ou [do not] want to tell non-executive employees they are
legally immune and can’t get the company in trouble.’”137 He further states
that in order for Boeing to successfully comply with the agreement, “‘[y]ou
want the company monitoring all employees.’”138
Most surprisingly, in another provision of the Boeing Non-Prosecution
Agreement, the Justice Department gave Boeing an additional license to
violate both the law and the agreement. Regardless of classification of
executive level employee, as long as Boeing reports the violation to the
Justice Department, it remains in good standing under the Agreement.139

the civil settlement with Boeing). See also Boeing Non-Prosecution Agreement, supra note 131, at
2–3 (providing the terms of the Boeing agreement with the Government).
133. See Boeing Non-Prosecution Agreement, supra note 131, at 2, 3, 5–8.
134. See id. at 9.
135. Id. at 3.
136. Russell Mokhiber & Robert Weissman, Boeing Criminal Agreement: Odd and Unusual,
July 10, 2006, available at http://www.commondreams.org/views06/0710-31.htm (quoting John
Coffee, Columbia University Law Professor).
137. Id. (quoting John Coffee, Columbia University Law Professor).
138. Id. (quoting John Coffee, Columbia University Law Professor).
139. Boeing Non-Prosecution Agreement, supra note 131, at 3, 5–8 (“[T]he commission of a
Defined Offense by a Boeing employee shall not be deemed to constitute the commission of a
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Moreover, the agreement grants Boeing procedural rights in the event
of notice of violation of the agreement—rights not present, or less favorable
to the company, in other non-prosecution or deferred prosecution
agreements.140 Specifically, upon written notice of violation, Boeing has
forty-five days to make a presentation that no breach has occurred.141
Boeing can appeal an adverse decision to a higher authority within the
Justice Department, but not a District Court, and if Boeing is found in
breach, the company must immediately pay any balances on fines due, and
the Justice Department, at its option, can either indict or impose a $10
million penalty.142
The Boeing agreement constitutes a significant change from the Justice
Department’s traditional approach to the resolution of corporate misconduct
by deferred or non-prosecution agreement. Normally, those agreements call
for sweeping corporate wide changes, compliance, and enforcement with
the ultimate goal of creating a culture of honesty and law abiding corporate
performance.143
VI. FORTY-FOUR AGREEMENTS: PATTERNS, ACHIEVEMENTS
AND COMMENTS
A. THE AGREEMENTS
Between 1994, when the Prudential Securities agreement was executed,
and June 2006, twenty-four major corporations entered into federal deferred
prosecution agreements (DPAs): Armour, Prudential Securities, Arthur
Andersen, Sears, BDO Seidman, PNC Financial, NY Racing Association,
Canadian Imperial Bank, Banco Popular, Computer Associates, Invision
Technologies, American International Group, America Online, AmSouth
Bancorp, KPMG, Bristol Myers Squibb, Monsanto, University of Medicine
and Dentistry of New Jersey, Operations Management International,
FirstEnergy Nuclear, Williams Power, Roger Williams Medical Center,
HVB, and BankAtlantic.
Additionally, between 1993, when the Salomon Brothers agreement
was executed, and June 2006, nineteen corporations have entered into
twenty federal non-prosecution agreements (NPAs): Salomon Brothers,
Aetna, Sequa, John Hancock, Lazard Freres, Merrill Lynch (1995), Coopers
& Lybrand, Aurora Foods, Merrill Lynch (2003), Symbol Technologies,
MCI-Worldcom, Micrus, Shell Oil, Adelphia, Hilfiger, American Electric
Defined Offense by Boeing so long as the underlying allegation or conduct is reported by
Boeing . . . .”).
140. Id. at 9. See, e.g., Computer Associates Agreement, supra note 90, at 20 (providing
Computer Associates a two-week period after notification of breach).
141. Boeing Non-Prosecution Agreement, supra note 131, at 9.
142. Id. at 9–11.
143. Thompson Memo, supra note 3.
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Power, Bank of New York, American International Group, HealthSouth,
and BAWAG.
These agreements, and a tabulation of the major provisions in the
agreements, are specified in Tables I and II. The Tables identify the
corporation, year of agreement, duration of the agreement, offenses
charged, whether individuals were charged, financial penalties imposed
(fines, forfeiture, restitution and civil penalties), and whether an agency
settlement was also reached. The Tables also identify undertakings of the
corporations, including, acceptance of responsibility, appointment of an
outside monitor or examiner, an obligation not to make public statements
that contradict a factual narrative in the agreement, cooperation with
government investigations, discharge of culpable employees, establishment
of a hotline, establishment of a new or improved compliance program, new
internal controls, waiver of attorney-client and work product privileges,
waiver of statute of limitations and speedy trial rights, creation of new
management or board positions, and creating a new training program.
It is important to note that the Justice Department has not made public
all of these agreements.144 The publicly available press releases in these
cases do not specify all provisions of the agreements. But the information
from the releases is included in the Tables for informational purposes.
B. ACHIEVEMENTS
The deferred prosecution agreements spawned by Prudential Securities
and the non-prosecution agreements which followed Salomon Brothers
have, in many respects, advanced important public interest objectives.
The Justice Department has succeeded in uncovering and dealing with a
dismal pattern of corporate misconduct. Since 1993, forty-three American
corporations have acknowledged serious wrongdoing in violation of a broad
array of federal criminal statutes, including securities fraud, tax fraud,
foreign corrupt practices, tax evasion, conspiracy, environmental offenses,
wire fraud and defense procurement fraud.145
These agreements resulted in the imposition of criminal fines totaling in
excess of three quarters of a billion dollars.146 Restitution settlements total
in excess of $3 billion, and civil penalties exceed one billion dollars.147
In several important instances, the agreements facilitated the indictment
and conviction of high ranking corporate executives.148 These indictments
144. The Justice Department has declared that “publication of agreements ‘is within the
discretion of individual U.S. attorney’s offices.’” Sue Reisinger, Did Hilfiger Corp. Get Special
Treatment From DOJ?, LAW.COM, June 28, 2006, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/ihc/
PubArticleIHC.jsp?id=1151399124566. See also infra Tables I & II. In Tables I & II, agreements
that have not been made public are italicized. Of the twenty-four DPAs in Table I, only one is not
public. Of the twenty NPAs in Table II, six are not publicly available.
145. See infra Tables I & II.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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spurred important changes in corporate governance, including replacement
of senior management, restructuring of corporate boards, and the creation of
hotlines for reporting corporate misconduct. Furthermore, in a number of
important instances, outside monitors or examiners have been created to
ensure requirements with the agreements and also with the requirements of
law have been met.149 In addition, many corporations have been required to
create or improve comprehensive compliance programs.150
Christopher J. Christie, in an analysis of the Bristol Myers deferred
prosecution agreement, applauded the ability of deferred prosecution
agreements to “achieve the goals of improved corporate governance and
renewed market confidence without destroying corporations and losing
American jobs in the process.”151 With considerable justification, Christie
concludes that the “deferred prosecution agreement between Bristol-Myers
and the United States Attorney’s Office for the District of New Jersey has
all of the elements necessary to achieve these goals.”152
Wrongdoing was identified and admitted to by the company. Specific
failures of governance were identified and remedies were suggested by
both parties and agreed to by the company. A respected federal monitor
was appointed to insure adherence to the agreement. Major steps were
taken to change the corporate culture through educational programs for
employees and directors and a new approach to the corporate budgeting
process. Restitution was made to those shareholders who were harmed by
the corporate crimes.153

Christie’s positive appraisal could well be applied to many of the
agreements considered in this essay.
C. COMMENTS
While the details of the forty-four agreements may be gleaned from
Tables I and II, several issues merit individual comment.

148. Id.; see also, e.g., Guilty, Not-Guilty, supra note 76 (noting several former executives who
were found guilty).
149. See infra Tables I & II; see, e.g., Non-Prosecution Agreement, Letter from U. S.
Attorney’s Office, Southern District of New York, to John T. Montgomery, Esq., Attorney for
Aurora Foods, Inc. 3 (Jan. 22, 2001); Non-Prosecution Agreement Between Symbol Technologies, Inc. and the U. S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of New York 7 (June 3, 2004).
150. See infra Tables I & II; see, e.g., KPMG DPA, supra note 102; Deferred Prosecution
Agreement between U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Criminal Div., Fraud Section and InVision
Technologies, Inc. (Dec. 3, 2004); United States v. The New York Racing Association, Inc. Cr.
03-1295 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2003) (Deferred Prosecution Agreement).
151. Christie & Hanna, supra note 59, at 1061.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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1. Monitors
The Prudential, KPMG, and Computer Associates agreements required
appointment of outside monitors, and 11 of the 24 DPAs have a monitor
requirement. External monitors, once the exclusive subject of criminal
RICO convictions, have now become an accepted reality in corporate
reform.154 However, the duties and responsibilities of these extra-judicial
officials vary markedly and have become an important topic (and source of
concern) in the corporate governance literature.
Corporate monitors have had, in some instances, a substantial impact on
corporate governance. In a striking example of the power of federal
corporate monitors, former Federal Judge Frederick B. Lacy, the corporate
monitor for Bristol-Myers Squibb, recommended the removal of the
company’s Chief Executive Officer, Peter R. Dolan; the Board accepted
Monitor Lacey’s recommendation.155 “[T]he episode has set off a debate
whether Mr. Lacey represents a tougher-style monitor who may put new
teeth into that role in corporate America—as some admirers hope—or
whether, in the view of some critics, he has overstepped his authority at
Bristol-Myers.”156
2. Public Statements
A new and important requirement appearing with increasing frequency
is an undertaking that the corporations not contradict representations and
factual statements in the agreement or a statement of facts appended to the
agreement. This occurs in 17 of the 24 DPAs. The impact of these detailed
admissions of culpability has generated litigation by indicted corporate
executives (KPMG)157 and raises concerns over the impact of these
statements in subsequent civil litigation against the corporation.
3. Waiver of Attorney-Client and Work Product Privileges
With increasing frequency, the agreements require the corporation to
waive attorney-client and work-product privileges. A waiver of these
privileges is present, overall, in 16 of the 24 DPAs and 9 of the 20 NPAs.
The issue of governmental pressure to induce corporations to waive
attorney-client and work product protection has received increased critical
attention and is explored in Section VII, infra.

154. See infra Tables I & II.
155. Avery Johnson & John Carreyrou, Bristol-Myers Faces More Scrutiny, WALL ST. J., Oct.
27, 2006, at A10; see also Frederick Lacey: An Independent Monitor With Teeth, Posting of Peter
Lattman to Wall Street Journal Law Blog, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2006/09/19/frederick-laceyan-independent-monitor-with-teeth/ (Sept. 19, 2006, 8:32 EST).
156. Stephanie Saul, A Corporate Nanny Turns Assertive, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2006 at C1.
157. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. See also Tables I & II.
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4. Financial Penalties
At least one form of financial penalties exists in virtually every DPA
and NPA. Fines as well as civil penalties are required in 10 of the 24 DPAs.
Restitution is required in 9 of the 24 DPAs. Every DPA required some sort
of financial penalty, but the allocation of these financial penalties between
fines, civil penalties and restitution appears to be a matter of ad hoc
negotiation.
5. Prosecution of Individuals
A common justification for resolving criminal investigations of
corporations is that these modes of disposition enable the government to
identify, prosecute and convict the “real wrongdoer.” But the majority of
DPAs and NPAs do not reflect the indictment of individual executives.
Indictment of executives is only reflected in 9 of the 20 NPAs and 8 of the
24 DPAs.
6. Governance Changes
Requirements that the corporation change corporate governance
organization and responsibility appear with increasing frequency in both
DPAs and NPAs. Tables I and II reveal a corporate governance change
requirement in 12 of the 20 NPAs and 13 of the 24 DPAs. Seven of the 24
DPAs require new management. In cases where senior executives have
been indicted, new management boards have been required in 2 of the 8
DPAs and only 2 of the 9 NPAs. The appropriateness of instituting farreaching corporate governance change by threat of criminal indictment
remains a lively topic in the corporate governance literature.
7. Cooperation and Acceptance of Responsibility
Cooperation is nearly a universal requirement (found in 21 of the 24
DPAs) coupled with explicit acceptance of responsibility (found in 18 of
the 24 DPAs). Cooperation is also a universal requirement of publicly
available NPAs (found in 14 of the 20 agreements), however, explicit
acceptance of responsibility only appears in 8 out of the 20 NPAs. Notably,
all of the NPAs and DPAs entered into after Thompson require full
cooperation. But the question of how the government perceives genuine
cooperation, and whether that cooperation must include waivers and nonassistance to non-cooperative and indicted executives remains a subject of
continuing controversy as explained below in Section VII.158

158. See also Edward Iwata, Debate Heats up on Justice’s Deferred-prosecution Deals,
USATODAY.COM, June 1, 2006.
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VII. CONCERNS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM
A. MISSING EXPLANATIONS
Deferred prosecution and non-prosecution agreements, even when
public, are not easily available for public inspection and criticism. The
decision to make an agreement public is left to the sole discretion of the
United States Attorney’s Office.159 Furthermore, the Justice Department
does not issue formal statements of policy as to why it selects a nonprosecution agreement over a deferred prosecution agreement. The absence
of Justice Department explanation makes informed public evaluation quite
difficult and raises concern because many of the non-prosecution
agreements reflect serious violations of the law. Moreover, there are
instances where a corporation has been the beneficiary of more than one
agreement and the Justice Department is not forthcoming with a public
statement as to why this approach is in the public interest.160
There is a potential solution to this lack of public disclosure. Congress
could create a statutory requirement that the Justice Department publicly
announce its acceptance of a non-prosecution or deferred prosecution
agreement accompanied by a brief statement of why this resolution is in the
public interest. As it happens, there is a statutory precedent for this
approach.
The Tunney Act (Tunney)161 was enacted in response to criticism
during the Watergate era of the way the Antitrust Division of the Justice
Department entered into consent decrees to terminate antitrust cases.162
Tunney requires the Justice Department, when it has achieved agreement
with a defendant on an antitrust consent decree, to file the proposed decree
publicly along with an impact statement.163 The impact statement details
what the government sought to achieve by the litigation, what the decree

159. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
160. AIG entered into a deferred prosecution agreement in 2004 resulting from charges of
aiding and abetting and securities fraud. See Deferred Prosecution Agreement between AIG-FP
PAGIC Equity Holding Corp. and U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Criminal Division, Fraud Section,
Western District of Pennsylvania (Nov. 30, 2004). In 2006, AIG, charged with filing false SEC
statements, entered into a non-prosecution agreement with the Justice Department’s Fraud section.
See Non-Prosecution Agreement, Letter from Paul E. Pelletier, Acting Chief, Fraud Section,
Criminal Div., U. S. Dep’t of Justice, to Martin Flumenbaum, Esq., Attorney for American
International Group, Inc. (Feb. 7, 2006). Additionally, Merrill Lynch entered into two nonprosecution agreements in eight years for charges of fraud. See infra Tables I & II; Letter from
U.S. Dept. of Justice, Enron Task Force, to Robert S Morvillo, Esq. & Charles Stillman, Esq.
Attorneys for Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. (Sept. 17, 2003); Settlement Agreement between Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. and Karen F. Green, Acting U.S. Attorney for the District of
Massachusetts (Oct. 26, 1995).
161. H.R. REP. NO. 1463, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6535,
6536–37.
162. See id.
163. 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (Supp. IV 2004).
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actually achieves, and why the proposed decree is in the public interest.164
Thereafter, public comment is invited and the court holds a limited hearing
to determine if the decree is in the public interest.165
Tunney is an attractive model to contemplate in thinking about ways to
improve public understanding and confidence in the deferred and nonprosecution process. The Boeing Non-Prosecution Agreement provides a
clear example of the need for a Tunney-like provision. If such a statute were
in place, the Justice Department would have been required to publicly
disclose what they sought to achieve by the criminal case, and why this
settlement of charges is in the public’s best interest. Surely, the public is
entitled to know why it is in its best interest that compliance is redefined for
Boeing and why Boeing, unlike any other entity entering into a deferred or
non-prosecution agreement, may be immune from liability for misconduct
committed by Boeing employees who are not part of senior management.
Admittedly, some Tunney provisions may be inappropriate in the
sphere of criminal enforcement, given the traditional judicial concern that
judges should not review exercises of prosecutorial discretion.166 But the
core Tunney concept of requiring the government to announce its decision
to dispose of a criminal case by a deferred prosecution or non-prosecution
agreement would advance the public interest. The public is entitled to know
that serious instances of corporate misconduct have been adequately dealt
with by the Justice Department by measures short of corporate indictment
and conviction. Public confidence would improve if the government were
required to offer a brief statement of why it believes a given settlement is in
the public interest.167 This modest proposal could also assist federal judges
in discharging their judicial responsibilities when presented with deferred
and non-prosecution agreements needing judicial approval. Most
importantly, this kind of statutory requirement assures the public that
corporate misconduct is effectively addressed, thereby increasing public
confidence in the criminal justice process.

164. See id.
165. See id. § 16(d), (e)(1).
166. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (“[T]he decision to prosecute is
particularly ill-suited to judicial review.”).
167. Indeed, the statements accompanying the Salomon and Prudential agreements could form
models of the kind of statement and explanation that should be statutorily required in all cases. See
supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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B. OVER-AGGRESSIVE PROSECUTORS?
Despite the positive achievements and success of deferred and nonprosecution agreements in addressing corporate misconduct, the frequency
of their use and the emphasis of government defined cooperation has
recently garnered sharp criticism. The expressed concern is that
corporations are being pushed too hard by overly aggressive prosecutors
who insist on cooperation, waiver of privilege, acknowledgment of
culpability, substantial corporate reform, and financial penalties, even in
cases where indictments might not ensue.168 As one former Justice
Department official explained:
[P]rosecutors have the unbridled discretionary power to insist that in order
to avoid ‘death,’ a corporation under investigation waive its privileges and
disclose otherwise protected information and advi[s]e and assist the
government in its investigation. Any corporation that tries to protect its
interests in the intensely adversarial setting of a criminal investigation, as
is its right, is likely to be punished.169

The recent comments regarding the Justice Department’s current policy
by Mary Jo White, the distinguished former United States Attorney for the
Southern District of New York (who crafted the Prudential agreement),
reflect a carefully weighted evaluation of these concerns.170 Ms. White
suggests that the automatic reaction to corporate misconduct should not be
an indictment or a deferred prosecution agreement.171 She notes instead that
“the Thompson memo, which governs federal prosecutors in deciding what
to do about a company, says it will be the rare case where a company
should be indicted.”172 Ms. White believes that “it should also be the rare
case where the government seeks a deferred prosecution agreement from
the company.”173
Far harsher criticisms regarding prosecutorial power accuse Justice
Department officials of exercising “unchecked power”—the equivalent of a
“state-sponsored shakedown scheme in which corporations are exhorted to
pay penalties grossly out of proportion to any actual misconduct.”174 Former
United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, James B.
168. Earl J. Silbert & Demme Doufekias, Under Pressure to Catch the Crooks: The Impact of
Corporate Privilege Waivers on the Adversarial System, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1225, 1228–29
(2006).
169. Id. at 1229.
170. See Interview with Mary Jo White, Partner, Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, New York, N.Y.
(Dec. 1, 2005), in 19 CORP. CRIME REP. 48(11) (Dec. 12, 2005).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Wray & Hur, supra note 78, at 1095 (citing N. Richard Janis, Deputizing Company
Counsel as Agents of the Federal Government: How Our Adversary System of Justice Is Being
Destroyed, WASH. LAW., Mar. 2005).
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Comey, in an interview distributed to all United States Attorneys, defends
Departmental policy: “[F]or a corporation to get credit for cooperation, it
must help the government catch the crooks.”175 “In sum, the Department
now contends that ‘there is nothing wrong’ with the Government using the
waiver of the privilege ‘to piggy-back on the investigation conducted by the
corporation.’”176 If the corporation seeks lenience, “it will have to figure out
a way to tell the Government what it knows about the misconduct and to
help us to catch the wrongdoers.”177
Defenders of current Justice Department policies attribute the problem,
in part, to a Rashômon-like difference of perception.178 Christopher A.
Wray, former Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division and
Principal Associate Deputy Attorney General, uses this idea of an “apparent
disconnect” to explain why the controversy over the government’s consistent request for waiver of attorney-client privilege is really a simple “mutual
misunderstanding.”179
Ask a prosecutor and a defense attorney who have just concluded a
negotiation session whether a waiver request was made, and you may well
have different answers from each. Mutual misunderstandings between the
two groups can help explain the chasm between the Justice Department’s
accounts of the rarity of waiver requests and the defense bar’s vehement
insistence that they occur routinely.180

Regardless of the differing perceptions between prosecutors and
defense lawyers, Tables I and II, infra, reveal that nearly 80% of the
deferred prosecution agreements contain a waiver of privilege. It is unlikely
that corporate counsel would waive the privilege unless they believed that
waiver was required by the government.181 This empirical data reinforces
175. Silbert & Doufekias, supra note 168, at 1227 (quoting Interview with United States
Attorney General James B. Comey Regarding Department of Justice Policy on Requesting
Corporations Under Criminal Investigation to Waive The Attorney-Client Privilege and Work
Product Protection, U. S. ATT’YS BULL., Nov. 2003, at 1 [hereinafter Comey Interview]).
176. Id. at 1228 (quoting Comey Interview).
177. Id. (quoting Comey Interview).
178. RASHÔMON (Daiei Motion Picture Co. Ltd. 1951). Rashômon is a Japanese film about a
murder mystery. The three main characters, the husband, the wife, and the bandit are called upon
to testify against the murder of the husband, and each testimony is different. One may say that the
underlying question presented in the film is “What is the truth?” For a description of the movie,
see Bosley Crowther, Roshômon, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1951.
179. Wray & Hur, supra note 78, at 1177.
180. Id. “[R]epresentatives of the Department dispute the underlying premise that prosecutors
are routinely requiring waiver in the course of government investigations.” Id. at 1176. The Justice
Department position on waiver is ably elaborated in Mary Beth Buchanan, Effective Cooperation
by Business Organizations and the Impact of Privilege Waivers, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 587,
588 (2004).
181. See, e.g., Stephen W. Graffman & Jeffrey L. Bornstein, New Memo Won’t Help, NAT’L L.
J., Nov. 14, 2005 (“In reality today, a corporation that does not waive these valuable privilege
rights effectively is considered a noncooperator.”). See also Tamara Loomis, Justice Encourages
Waiving Attorney-Client Privilege, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 20, 2003, at 1 (citing Roberto J. Anello, partner
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the conclusion of the American Corporate Counsel Association that it is
“the regular practice of U.S. Attorneys to require corporations to waive
their attorney-client privileges and divulge confidential conversations and
documents in order to prove cooperation with prosecutors’
investigations.”182
A related claim of overreaching by federal prosecutors in negotiating
deferred prosecution agreements centers on the issue of whether a
corporation should agree not to advance or reimburse legal fees for indicted
executives after the corporation has entered into a deferred prosecution
agreement. This issue has received substantial public attention in the
upcoming criminal trial of former KPMG executives.183 The indicted
executives of KPMG have charged that the government’s agreement with
KPMG violated their Sixth Amendment right to counsel.184 The basis for
the claim centers on conversations between United States Attorneys and
KPMG regarding the payment of indicted employees legal fees and what
constitutes government cooperation.185 The government asserted that
KPMG’s decisions not to reimburse indicted executives was not due to
government pressure, but a mutual misunderstanding.186 Judge Lewis
Kaplan rejected the government’s position:
The government was economical with the truth in its early responses to
this motion. It is difficult to defend even the literal truth of the position it
took in its first memorandum of law. KPMG’s decision on payment of
attorneys’ fees was influenced by its interaction with the USAO and thus
cannot fairly to be said to have been a decision “made by KPMG alone,”
as the government represented.187

Judge Kaplan went on to state, “Every court is entitled to complete
candor from every attorney, and most of all from those who represent the
United States. These actions by the USAO are disappointing. There should
be no recurrence.”188

at Morvillo Abramowitz Grand Iason & Silberberg). In describing the prosecutor’s promise of
cooperation and thus no indictment as a means to get a business organization to waive the
attorney-client privilege, Mr. Anello states, “It’s phrased as a carrot, but it’s really a stick.” Id.
182. Wray & Hur, supra note 78, at 1175–76 (quoting Letter from the American Corporate
Counsel Association to U.S. Dep’t of Justice (May 12, 2000)).
183. See, e.g., Lynnley Browning, Ex-Officials of Justice Dept. Oppose Prosecutors’ Tactic in
Corporate Criminal Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2006, at C4; Stephanie Kirchgaessner, Hardline
Justice Department Starts to Feel the Heat, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2006, at 2; Lynnley Browning,
U.S. Tactic on KPMG Questioned, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2006, at C1; Stephanie Kirchgaessner &
Patti Waldmeir, Judge Rebukes Prosecutors on KPMG Case, FIN. TIMES, June 28, 2006, at 5.
184. See United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 365–66 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
185. See id. at 351–52.
186. See id.
187. Id. at 381.
188. Id.
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Judge Kaplan concluded that aspects of Thompson violated the Sixth
Amendment constitutional right to legal representation:189
[S]o much of the Thompson Memorandum and the activities of the USAO
as threatened to take into account, in deciding whether to indict KPMG,
whether KPMG would advance attorneys’ fees to present or former
employees in the event they were indicted for activities undertaken in the
course of their employment interfered with the rights of such employees to
a fair trial and to the effective assistance of counsel and therefore violated
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution.190

On November 15, 2006, Judge Kaplan, expressing concern that “‘there
is a real and growing possibility that some and perhaps all [of the KPMG
defendants] lack funds necessary to their defense[,]’” indefinitely postponed
the trial of the KMPG defendants. 191 Judge Kaplan observed:
“This court found, after a full evidentiary hearing, that the government
violated the rights of the KPMG defendants by inducing KPMG—which
otherwise would have advanced defense costs—to cut off payments upon
indictment. . . . If KPMG is obliged to pay, payment could greatly mitigate
the impact of the government’s improper actions. This in turn could
diminish the advisability of dismissal or other potentially serious
sanctions. If KPMG is not obliged to pay, or if a prompt determination is
not feasible, the issue of sanctions could be considered after exhaustion of
that possibility.”192

VIII. THE RENEWAL OF ORGANIZATIONAL INDICTMENT AND
THE CONTINUING CONTROVERSY OVER PRIVILEGE
WAIVER
The issue of governmental demands for privilege waiver was a central
factor in the indictment of the law firm of Milberg Weiss Bershad &
Schulman and two of its named partners.193 The indictment of the law firm
189. See Lynnley Browning, Judge Questions, supra note 111. Judge Kaplan granted limited
discovery and an evidentiary hearing on defendant’s claim “that the government, through the
Thompson Memo . . . has violated defendants’ [Sixth Amendment] right to counsel by improperly
interfering with KPMG’s ability to choose to advance to defendants legal fees and other defense
costs . . . .” United States v. Stein, 2006 WL 1063298, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2006) (No. 05
Crim. 0888).
190. United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
191. Lynnley Browning, Judge Delays KPMG Tax Trial Over Legal Fees Dispute, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 15, 2006, at C1 (quoting Judge Lewis A. Kaplan).
192. Id. (quoting Judge Lewis A. Kaplan).
193. See First Superseding Indictment, United States v. Milberg Weiss Bershad & Schulman
LLP, David J. Bershad, Steven G. Schulman, Seymour Lazar, and Paul T. Selzer, CR 05-587(A)DDP (C.D.C.A. 2006). See also, Press Release, U.S. Attorney, Central District of California,
Milberg Weiss Law Firm, Two Senior Partners Indicted in Secret Kickback Scheme Involving
Named Plaintiffs in Class Action Lawsuits (May 18, 2006) (describing the indictment); John R.
Wilke, Nathan Koppel & Peter Sanders, Milberg Indicted on Charges Firm Paid Kickbacks,
WALL ST. J., May 19, 2006, at A1.
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comes after negotiations failed between the firm and the government for a
deferred prosecution agreement.194 The underlying charge is that the firm
and two named partners engaged in secret rebates to lead plaintiffs in class
action cases.195 This indictment “represents the most prominent
confrontation between the government and a law firm in years.”196 A
statement from Milberg Weiss reveals that the negotiations failed because
of “[t]he government’s insistence that the firm waive attorney-client
privileges as a condition to avoiding indictment.”197 Milberg Weiss asserts
this condition “is in derogation of one of the bedrock principles of
American law.”198 The statement added: “The prosecutors also insisted that
the firm make unfounded statements accusing its own partners of crimes
and otherwise become an agent for the government. Unfortunately, the
prosecutors insisted on indicting the firm unless it made these impossible
concessions.”199
A similar concern over the government’s policy on privilege waiver has
been voiced in a Federalist Society paper:
[Government enforcement policies] have put companies on notice that any
refusal to waive such [attorney-client and work-product] privileges and
protections could be viewed as a failure to cooperate with a government
investigation and be held against the company when determining whether
to charge or how to sentence a company for its alleged
wrongdoing. . . . Current DOJ policy thus forces businesses to choose
between cooperation that may include privilege waiver, potentially
providing other litigation adversaries with privileged material that they
would otherwise not be entitled to receive, and facing the consequences of

194. See, e.g., Milberg Weiss Statement (May 18, 2006), http://www.milbergweissjustice.com/
ourstatements.php. On the firm’s website, the provided statements made by Mel Weiss regarding
the indictment:
The firm has held intense negotiations with government officials in Los Angeles and
Washington over the past six months in an effort to avoid this unjust result. The
government’s insistence that the firm waive attorney-client privileges as a condition to
avoiding indictment is in derogation of one of the bedrock principles of American law
and extended to parties the firm did not control . . . Unfortunately, the prosecutors
insisted on indicting the firm unless it made these concessions.
Id.

195. See, e.g., Milberg Weiss Justice, Unsubstantiated Allegations, http://www.milbergweiss
justice.com/thecase_allegations.php (last visited Nov. 10, 2006) (“The Justice Department alleges
that Milberg Weiss knowingly paid lead plaintiffs in a small number of its cases.”); see also
Milberg Weiss Statement, supra note 194.
196. Law Firm Indicted in Kickback Case, ORLANDO SENTINEL, May 19, 2006, at C3.
197. Milberg Weiss Statement, supra note 194.
198. Id.
199. Id.
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being deemed to have failed to cooperate in the government
investigation.200

The American Bar Association has asked the House Judiciary
committee to encourage the Justice Department to end the “culture of
waiver.”201 Responding to concerns about the waiver requirement, the U.S.
Sentencing Commission voted on April 5, 2006 to submit to Congress a
revision of the waiver of attorney-client privilege provision.202
The controversy over the Justice Department policy on the waiver issue
in negotiating the deferred prosecution agreements led to a Senate Judiciary
Hearing in September 2006.
A coalition of business and legal organizations, including the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, American Bar Association, Association of
Corporate Counsel and National Association of Criminal Lawyers,
contends that the Thompson memo has created a “culture of waiver” in
which federal prosecutors now routinely demand waiver of attorney-client
and work product protections even where there are less intrusive means of
getting information.203

Former Attorney General Edwin Meese III urged that Thompson
eliminate all references to waiver in making a charging decision.204 In
response to a statement by Deputy Attorney General Paul McNulty
defending current Department policy, Senator Arlen Specter countered: “As
I read this policy, I think it is coercive and may even rise to the level of
being a bludgeon. I would ask you to reconsider the policy.”205 At the

200. George Terwilliger III & Darryl S. Lew, Privilege in Peril: Corporate Cooperation in the
New Era of Government Investigations 3, 7 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 25,
26–27, available at http://www.fed-soc.org/Publications/Engage/ March%202006.pdf (citations
omitted).
201. Press Release, ABA Urges Congress to Stem Culture of Waiver of Attorney-Client
Privilege in Probes of Corporations (March 6, 2006). See also R. William Ide III et al., Report of
the American Bar Association’s Task Force on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 60 BUS. LAW. 1029,
1050–55 (2005) (proposing solutions opposing the government’s practice of seeking waiver of the
attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine).
202. Press Release, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, U.S. Sentencing Commission Votes to Amend
Guidelines for Terrorism, Firearms, and Steroids (Apr. 11, 2006), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/PRESS/rel0406.htm. The Commission voted at that session to promulgate an
amendment “deleting the 2004 commentary to the organizational sentencing guidelines stating
that waiver of attorney-client privileges and work product protections is a not a pre-requisite for
an organization to receive credit for cooperation at sentencing.” Id. See also Patti Waldmeir,
Companies Fight Over Waivers, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2005 (“Responding to pressure from
business and lawyers’ groups, the commission held hearings this week on whether to amend the
guidelines to discourage compelled waivers.”).
203. Marcia Coyle, DOJ Reviewing Guidelines for Corporate Investigations, NAT’L L. J., Sept.
14, 2006.
204. Id. (quoting Former Reagan Attorney General Edwin Meese III).
205. Id. (quoting Arlen Specter, R-Pa.).
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present time, it is difficult to predict whether the Justice Department will
change its basic approach to the waiver issue.206
IX. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
Decades ago, legal realists taught that the state of the law should be
gleaned not simply from formal substantive legislative and judicial
pronouncements but from the law as applied by enforcers, civil, criminal,
and private. This perspective helps in understanding the American “law” of
corporate criminal liability in the twenty first century.
The substantive law governing corporate criminal liability is derived
from congressional enactments and Supreme Court pronouncements and
has remained unchanged for more than a century. However, the operative
rules of corporate criminal liability and their application have undergone
profound change. That change derives from the actions of a unique federal
“agency,” the United States Sentencing Commission, combined with the
enforcement arm of our federal constitutional system, the United States
Department of Justice and those who carry out Justice Department policy,
the nation’s United States Attorneys. Together, these efforts resulted in a
quiet legal revolution that made corporate indictment and conviction an
extreme rarity, and the prosecution of culpable corporate executives
commonplace.
The corporation is now typically seen by the federal government not as
the culprit in need of punishment, but as the facilitator/cooperator in the
task of indicting and convicting culpable executives. To discharge its newly
created law enforcement partnership with the federal government, the
corporation routinely abandons attorney-client privilege and agrees not to
contradict a detailed statement of culpability that often becomes the
blueprint for prosecution of indicted executives.
At the same time, in an era where the penal policy goal of rehabilitation
has been abandoned in the prosecution of individuals,207 rehabilitation has

206. It is noteworthy that two recent agreements did not contain any provisions requiring the
waiver of attorney-client or work product privileges. The first is a non-prosecution agreement
entered into with Royal Ahold, a Dutch food conglomerate on September 25, 2006 with the
USAO of the Southern District of Florida. See Letter from Michael J. Garcia, U.S. Attorney for
the Southern District of New York, to Lawrence Byrne, Esq., White & Case LLP, Royal Ahold
N.V. and U.S. Foodservice, Inc. (Sept. 25, 2006), available at http://www.corporatecrime
reporter.com/documents/ahold.pdf. The second is a deferred prosecution agreement entered into
by the USAO of the Northern District of Florida with Mantra Films and MRA Holding, LLC for
charges stemming from the exploitation of minors on September 12, 2006. See Press Release, U.S.
Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Florida, ‘Girls Gone Wild’ Pleads Guilty in Sexual
Exploitation Case (Sept. 12, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/fln/press%20releases/
2006/sept/mantrapressrelease.htm.
207. See Leonard Orland, From Vengeance to Vengeance: Sentencing Reform and the Demise
of Rehabilitation, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 29, 29 (1978).
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been rehabilitated, sub silento, as a goal in corporate prosecution.208 The
rehabilitated corporation adopts codes of ethics and compliance programs,
reports to and may be managed by outside monitors, files detailed reports to
the government, and cooperates with the Justice Department in the
prosecution of former senior executives. In short, it demonstrates, on pain
of prosecution for failure to do so, that it is indeed a “good corporate
citizen.”209
Whether or not this approach will be an enduring feature of the
American criminal justice system remains to be seen.

208. In explaining and defending the Bristol Myers Squib deferred prosecution agreement, the
United States Attorney declared: “The action by the government was firm, decisive and geared
toward rehabilitating a damaged corporation.” Christie & Hannah, supra note 59, at 1061.
209. Reflecting the widely held view in the Justice Department, United States Attorney Christie
recently declared that “deferred prosecution agreements allow prosecutors and companies to work
together in creative and flexible ways to remedy past problems and set the corporation on the road
of good corporate citizenship.” Id. at 1043.

